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Tax expenditures, in the form of tax provisions, are government expenditures.  They are 
conceptually and functionally distinct from those tax provisions whose purpose is to raise revenue. Tax 
expenditure programs are comparable to entitlement programs.  Therefore, tax expenditures must be 
analyzed in spending terms and integrated into the budgetary process to ensure fiscal accountability.  In 
addition, tax expenditures must be audited for performance and the information must be published (with 
comprehensive analysis) to ensure fiscal transparency.  
 
This paper analyzes the concept/definition, size, effects of tax expenditures, as well as the fiscal 
accountability and transparency of tax expenditure spending.  In short, tax expenditures affect (1) the 
budget balance, (2) budget prioritization in allocation, (3) the effectiveness and efficiency of fiscal 
resources, and (4) the scope for abuse by taxpayers, government officials and legislators. While reviewing 
the current practices in tax expenditures against the requirements of fiscal accountability and transparency, 
the paper finds that this fiscal area must be strengthened.  
 
The paper sketches four building blocks to strengthen tax expenditures towards fiscal 
accountability and transparency, based on the literature developed by Professors Stanley S. Surry and Paul 
R McDaniel, the practices from developed and developing countries, the Campos/Pradhan fiscal 
accountability model and the IMF’s fiscal transparency code.   
 
The paper argues that normative/benchmark tax structure, a revenue-raising component of the tax 
system, should be formalized.  The normative/benchmark tax structure should be legally defined in the tax 
law and should be transparent.  The tax receipts from this normative/benchmark tax structure should be 
quantified and published.  Presently, many countries could publish imputed tax revenue from 
normative/benchmark tax structures, because such data is available.  Only if imputed tax revenue is 
published in the same way as the other budget components -- tax revenue received, tax expenditures, direct 
expenditures and fiscal balance -- will a budget system be truly transparent in terms of revenue-raising 
activities and expenditure activities.  In addition, when the tax revenue-raising activity is formalized, the 
inherent spending nature of tax expenditures is further exposed.  Therefore, tax expenditures should be 
added to direct expenditures, forming total government expenditures.  Furthermore, the conventional 
concept of the size of government should be remedied by including both direct expenditures and tax 
expenditures.   
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“Even though spending programs show up in the federal budget and tax expenditures are not included as 
federal spending, taxpayers are paying for the program in either case. Both should be transparent and subject 
to periodic oversight concerning such factors as whether they meet the program’s objectives or conflict with 
other government programs, grants, and regulations that have similar objectives.” 
 
“Understanding the Tax Reform Debate: Background, Criteria, & Questions” 
Government Accountability Office, The United States, September, 2005  
 
Tax incentives are popular policy measures used in both high- and low- income 
countries, but there are differences in how high-income and low-income countries deal 
with them. The high-income countries (most of them Organization for Economic Co-
operations and Development (OECD) member states) recognize that a tax incentive is a 
type of government spending in the form of a tax expenditure. A tax expenditure, a 
component of the tax system, functionally provides government financial assistance by 
not collecting tax revenue otherwise due. High-income countries have introduced tax 
expenditure accounting and subject tax expenditures to normal budgetary controls.  
 
Many low-income countries, even those with high public debt and those in which 
the majority of the population is below the poverty line (less than US$1 a day), have 
embraced tax incentives. Their spending in tax expenditures has decreased their revenue 
received, reducing these countries’ capacity to assist the needs of the poor. Ironically, the 
poor do not benefit from tax incentives because their income is usually below the tax 
thresholds. None of these countries, so far, use tax expenditure accounting or subject tax 
expenditures to normal budgetary control. Many other transition economies and 
developing nations also use tax incentives, but in most cases they have not taken 
sufficient steps to make tax incentives accountable.    
 
Similar to the differences between high- and low- income countries on tax 
incentives, there are differences of opinion between tax policy advisers. One group of tax 
policy advisers recognizes the concept of tax expenditures and understands that tax 
incentives are tax expenditures. They analyze tax incentives as spending items, using 
spending terminology. Other tax policy advisers attempt to discuss tax incentives as 
normative tax provisions. Stanley Surrey’s comment on this approach: “A tax 
expenditure is a spending program and must therefore be analyzed in spending terms. To 
attempt to discuss the program as if it were a normative tax provision is to disregard this 
fact.” (Surrey and McDaniel, 1985). 
 
This paper analyzes the concept/definition, the size and the effects of tax 
expenditures, as well as the fiscal accountability and transparency of tax expenditure 
spending, based on the literature developed by Stanley S. Surrey and Paul R. McDaniel, 
the experience and practice of the OECD countries (who have dealt with tax expenditures 
for about 30 years); the Campos/Pradhan fiscal accountability model and the IMF fiscal 
transparency code. This paper will focus primarily on those developing countries that are   3
keen to apply the concept of tax expenditures but lack knowledge and experience
 2,  
Section I presents the concept of tax expenditures. Section II discusses the size and the 
fiscal effects of tax expenditures. Section III discusses fiscal accountability and 
transparency in tax expenditures.  Section IV set forth the building blocks for fiscal 
accountability and transparency in tax expenditures. Section V concludes.  
 
I. The Concept of Tax Expenditures 
A.  Definition 
A tax expenditure, in broad terms, is a tax provision that deviates from a 
normative or a benchmark tax system. Tax expenditures may take a number of forms: 
exclusions, exemptions, allowance, deductions, credits, preferential tax rates, or tax 
deferrals. Tax holidays and tax free zones are tax expenditures subject to specific time 
periods or geographical areas.  
 
To identify tax expenditures, a normative or a benchmark tax structure must be 
established. The normative or benchmark tax structure does not contain any tax 
provisions used to implement government spending programs for favored activities and 
groups.  
 
“The tax expenditures concept recognizes that a tax system contains two 
components which are conceptually and functionally distinct, though interwoven, in the 
tax law.  One component contains those provisions necessary to implement the normative 
tax structure; the other contains those provisions -- the tax expenditure provisions -- 
whose function and effect are to implement government spending programs” (McDaniel 
and Surrey, 1985). 
 
B.  Normative Income Tax Structure   
 
The concept of a normative, or benchmark, income tax structure was first 
introduced in the US in the 1960s. Its analysis is appropriate to any broad-based tax 
intended for general application, such as a consumption tax (for examples, a retail sales 
tax, or a VAT), a property tax, or a wealth transfer tax (Surrey and McDaniel, 1985)
3.  
 
In a normative income tax structure, the concept of “net income” is defined based 
on the Schanz-Haig-Simons (S-H-S) economic definition of income as an increase in net 
economic wealth between two points of time, plus consumption during that period. 
“Consumption” covers all consumption except that incurred as a cost in the earning or 
production of income.  However, that income concept using the S-H-S approach covers a 
very wide range of income. In fact, some of the items within the definition of “net 
income” are not commonly regarded as income for tax purposes, though they fall within 
this economic definition of income. The S-H-S approach has to be moderated.  
                                                 
2 For an example, China held a conference, “International Forum for Tax Expenditures,” in December, 
2002 and invited experts from Australia, Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands, the World Bank, and the IMF 
to discuss the concept and practice of tax expenditure management around the world.   
3 For example, Canada also applies tax expenditure concepts to its goods and services tax. France applies 
tax expenditure concepts to its VAT.    4
Also, the S-H-S approach does not specify the accounting technique to be used.  
A practical, commonly-used accounting technique, such as business accounting, must be 
identified. There are also other elements of a tax structure, such as the taxable unit, rate 
schedule, accounting period, and the determination of whether the tax base will be 
inflation-adjusted. There are no normative concepts for these elements. They reflect the 
decisions that must be made in accordance with fiscal and other policies.  Once these 
decisions are made, any special departures from those decisions constitute tax 
expenditures.     
 
To summarize, the concept of a normative income tax structure has been 
established in the US by the application of the S-H-S income concept, business 
accounting techniques, and the generally-accepted rules on with some exclusions of 
income (for example, the exclusion of “income” from unrealized appreciation in asset 
values) (Surrey and McDaniel, 1985).  Because many elements of tax structures are 
decided based on “the generally-accepted rules,” the normative income tax structure is 
also called the benchmark income tax structure.    
 
Countries’ tax laws differ in various aspects; so do definitions of normative or 
benchmark tax structures.  As a result, applications of the definitions of tax expenditures 
(departures from normative tax structures) also differ from country to country (Box 1).  
 
For example, a country may consider child-care expenses a cost of earning 
income and therefore a part of the benchmark tax structure, while others would consider 
tax assistance for child-care expenses to be a tax expenditure.      5
 
C. Tax Expenditures and Related Transactions 
In the tax expenditure concept, two transactions are involved in tax revenue and in 
direct expenditures: the normative tax liability paid by taxpayers (calculated based on the 
normative tax structure -- tax expenditures excluded) and a government appropriation of 
funds to taxpayers who benefit from tax expenditure programs. However, governments 
use tax expenditures to short-circuit the direct spending process by having only one net 
payment (netting out the tax expenditures from normative tax liabilities) by the taxpayers 
(Surrey and McDaniel, 1985).   
 
D. Factors in the Revenue Process 
The tax expenditure concept recognizes that there are three key factors involved 
in the revenue process: the imputed normative tax revenue from a normative tax structure; 
tax expenditures; and “net tax revenue” or “tax revenue received.”  The relationship 
among those three factors can be stated as follows: “net tax revenue/tax revenue 
received” is the difference between the “normative tax revenue” and “tax expenditures.” 
This relationship can be formulated as follows:  
 
Normative Tax Revenue – Tax expenditures = Net Tax Revenue (Tax Revenue 
received)  
 
E. Tax expenditures vs. Entitlement Programs  
Tax expenditures are comparable to entitlement programs, which are direct 
expenditures. A tax expenditure allows any qualified taxpayer to reduce his or her tax 
Box 1. Definitions of Tax Expenditures, Country Examples 
 
Austria: “Government income forgone due to exceptions from the general tax norm to the 
advantage of other agents with a view to their private activities performed in the interest of 
the general public.”  
Canada, using a broad approach: “only the most fundamental structural elements of each 
tax system are considered part of the benchmark.” So that the deviations from tax 
benchmarks are tax expenditures 
France: “Any legislative or administrative measure may be called a tax expenditures if its 
application entails a loss of revenue from the State, and hence a lessening of taxpayers’ 
burden in comparison to that which would have resulted under the “norm”, that is the 
general principles of French tax law.”  
Germany: tax expenditures are those tax incentives that are special deviations from the 
central concept of a tax norm, which involve a shortfall of receipts. 
Spain: “departures from the normal tax structure which represent tax incentives or tax 
subsidies”.  
United States Federal Government: Tax expenditures are revenue losses resulting from 
federal tax provisions that grant special tax relief designed to encourage certain kind of 
behavior by taxpayers or to aid taxpayer in special circumstances.  These provisions may, in 
effect, be viewed as spending programs channeled through the tax system (2000).  
Sources: H. P. Brixi, et. al. 2003; K.C. Messere, 1993; and the US Congressional Research 
Service, 2002.  6
liabilities, while an entitlement program is paid to all eligible persons.  But there are 
fundamental differences in the appropriation of funds to tax expenditures and to 
entitlement programs. Tax expenditures are generally enacted as permanent legislation.  
Entitlement programs must be appropriated periodically through the budgetary process.  
There are many critics who argue that tax expenditures, like entitlement programs, should 
periodically be thoroughly reconsidered to determine whether they are efficiently meeting 
the needs and goals for which they were originally established (the US Congressional 
Research Service, 2002).  
Box 2. Tax Expenditure, Incentive, and Tax Penalty 
Tax expenditures vs incentives.  All tax incentives are tax expenditures; they are designed 
to change behavior to achieve particular economic and social targets. But not all tax 
expenditures are tax incentives.  Tax expenditures could be used to subsidize particular 
taxpayers.  For example, tax subsides that are used to reduce hardships are tax expenditures, 
but they are not tax incentives.   
Tax penalty. A tax expenditure is a deviation from a normative or a benchmark tax system. 
When a tax provision allows the government to collect more revenue than it would under 
the normative tax, this provision is equivalent to a directly imposed governmental fine or 
penalty. Such a provision is called a “tax penalty.”  
An example, in the personal income tax, would be the denial of a deduction for an 
expenditure that constitutes a cost of producing income, even though this expenditure would 
be deductible under normative principles. This denial does not relate to any incentive. 
Therefore, in terms of tax expenditures, a tax penalty is the opposite of a tax expenditure, 
which increases revenue.  Therefore, if we represent tax expenditures as positive figures 
(consistently with the treatment of direct expenditures), then tax penalties should be  
negative figures.  
Source: McDaniel, P.R. and S. Surrey, “International Aspects of Tax Expenditures: A 
Comparative Study” 1985.   7
II. The Size of Tax Expenditures and Their Fiscal Effects  
 
A.  The Size of Tax Expenditures 
According to published country tax expenditure data, the size of tax expenditures 
varies among countries. In 2003, the size of tax expenditures was over 2 percent of GDP 
in the Netherlands, 4 percent of GDP in Australia, and about 7 percent of GDP, in 
Canada and in the US.  Table 1 below gives the estimates of the average size of tax 
expenditures in Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, and the US from 2000 to 2003.   
  
By comparing tax expenditures to integrated tax expenditures and direct 
expenditures (referred to as “total expenditures”), Table 1 shows that governments have 
used tax expenditures to implement a significant portion of their total expenditures. The 
Australian government has used tax expenditures to allocate 15 percent of its total 
expenditures; the Canadian government has used tax expenditures to allocate about 30 
percent of its total expenditures; the Netherlands government has used tax expenditures to 
allocate 4 percent of total expenditures, and the US government has used tax expenditures 
to allocate 26 percent of its total expenditures.
4   
 
Like direct expenditures, tax expenditures tend to grow. Sometimes, the growth of 
tax expenditures is faster than that of direct expenditures. For example, according to 
recent released data from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) of the US, the 
federal government’s tax expenditures increased from about US$400 billion in fiscal year 
1993
5 to US$850 billion in fiscal year 2004
6 (which represents a 113 percent increase 
from 1993 to 2004). Federal direct expenditures were US$1,409.5 billion in 1993 and 
US$2,292.2 billion in 2004 (a 62 percent increase from 1993 to 2004). There are many 
similar examples from other countries.   
 
Poland (central government only), for example, has not established tax 
benchmarks that could be used to compose a full list of tax expenditures, but the size of a 
number of commonly recognized tax incentives is large. According to a Ministry of 
Finance document
7, over 300 tax incentives in the nature of tax expenditures have been 
established sine 1992. Among them, there were 200 tax incentives relating to personal 
income tax (PIT), and 100 tax incentives relating to corporate income tax (CIT) and VAT. 
According to the Polish Ministry of Finance, the estimated size of a group of 18 tax 
incentives in the PIT (less than 10 percent of the total of 200 PIT tax incentives) was 1 
percent of GDP (annual average) from 1993 to 2000. If all the 300 tax incentives were 
estimated, the total cost would be significant.  
                                                 
4 The aggregate total of tax expenditures has not taken into account changes in the behavior of taxpayers, 
nor the amount of tax reduction that may result when a taxpayer takes advantage of a tax expenditure; it 
may lower his/her tax bracket to a lower level in a progressive tax rate schedule.  
5 “Tax Policy, Tax Expenditures Deserve More Scrutiny,” GAO, USA, June 1994. 
6“Understanding the Tax Reform Debate,” GAO, USA, August, 2005. 
7 Poland Ministry of Finance, “The White Paper for Tax,” 1989.   8
Table 1. Central Government Tax Expenditures, 1999/2000-2002/2003
(annual, in percent of GDP, unless otherwise specified)
Australia Canada Netherlands US
2003 2000-03 2003 2000-03 2002 1999-2002 2003 2000-03
Average Average Average Average
Revenue (received) 23.1 23.3 15.3 15.8 45.9 46.9 16.5 18.8
Tax expenditures 3.8 4.1 6.6 8.0 2.0 2.0 7.0 6.8
Direct expenditures 22.4 22.9 14.8 14.8 47.5 46.6 19.9 19.1
Total expenditures 
a/ 26.2 27.0 21.4 22.8 49.5 48.6 26.9 25.9
Tax expenditures/total exp. (%) 14.5 15.2 30.8 35.1 4.0 4.1 26.0 26.3
Sources: "Tax Expenditure Statement" 2000-2004,Treasury, Australia;
"Tax Expenditures" and budgetary tables, 2000-2004, Department of Finance, Canada;
"Tax Expenditures" 1999-2003, Ministry of Finance, the Netherlands; and
"Tax Expenditures by Function" and FY 2005 Budget, Office of Management and Budget, USA. 
a/ "Total expenditures" is the sum of "tax expenditures" and "direct expenditures."  
 
In Turkey (central government only) the potential tax benchmarks for PIT, CIT 
and VAT have been studied. A list of potential tax expenditures has been compiled that 
contains 186 tax expenditures relating to PIT, CIT, VAT, and special consumption tax.  
Most of these tax expenditures are on a large scale and are very generous. Recently, 
Turkey has officially estimated the cost of 15 tax expenditures provisions, which is 1.6% 
of GDP. However, according to various analyses and preliminary estimates from other 
organizations, the total cost of tax expenditures, adding the other omitted tax 
expenditures, would raise to at least 5% of GDP in 2003.     
 
In China (both central and local governments), for example, tax expenditure 
policy has become popular since 1978, when China launched an economic transformation 
from a planned to a social market economy. The government has not established a tax 
benchmark structure, but it recognizes that most tax incentives in its system are tax 
expenditures. The estimated cost of tax expenditures is not available to the public, even 
though the central government has made estimates for about 100 tax expenditures.  
However, according to a reputable tax expert in China, the total number of tax 
expenditures is probably 1000, more or less
8. The size of the tax expenditures could be 
well over 10% of GDP
9 in 2002.   
 
B.  The Effects of Tax Expenditures on the Budget  
Similarly to direct expenditures, tax expenditures, as spending items, affects fiscal 
budget balance, prioritizing resource allocation, efficiency and cost-effectiveness.  
Because tax expenditures (enacted as part of the tax law) constitute one component of a 
tax structure, the impact of tax expenditures on the simplicity of the tax administration is 
also discussed below.  
 
1.  Tax expenditures reduce tax revenue, which affects the budget balance  
                                                 
8 Based on telephone interview with a Chinese expert in tax policy, conducted on October 19, 2005.  
9 H.P. Brixi et al., “Tax Expenditures -- Shedding Light On Government Spending Through the Tax 
System,” 2004.   9
Tax expenditures, in reducing tax revenue received (or net tax revenue), reduce 
the overall budget balance like direct expenditures. As a result, the overall budget deficit 
will increase or the overall budget surplus will decrease if direct expenditures are 
constant.   
 
While reducing tax expenditures, net tax revenue will increase.  As a result, the 
overall budget deficit will decrease or the overall budget surplus will increase if direct 
expenditures are constant.  
 
Tax expenditures, directly financed from the tax base, are open-ended funding. 
Without periodically budgetary appropriation and review, tax expenditures are free to 
grow apace with changes in economy and society, which may increase spending. (For 
example, tax exemptions for income from social security in middle income countries 
increase when more people reach the age qualifying for those social benefits.) That open-
ended spending aspect of tax expenditures, reducing net tax revenue, results in lack of 
control over the entire budget.    
 
There are many examples from both developed and developing countries that 
widespread use of tax expenditures jeopardizes fiscal balance and fiscal sustainability. 
For example, the US Treasury listed 146 tax expenditures in 2004, which is up about 26 
percent since the last major tax reform legislation in 1986. The total cost of tax 
expenditures is US$850 billion (by outlay-equivalents measures) in 2004, which will lead 
to fiscal unsustainability.  That situation was reported by the GAO in September 2005: 
“Absent policy changes on the spending and/or revenue sides of the budget, a growing 
imbalance between federal spending and tax revenues will mean escalating and 
ultimately unsustainable federal deficits and debt.” For example, “if discretionary 
spending grows at the same rate as the economy and all expiring tax provisions are 
extended, federal revenues could be adequate to cover little more than interest on the 
federal debt by 2040.” 
 
In another example, Bangladesh’s tax system is plagued with numerous 
exemptions and tax holidays for both income tax and VAT.  As a result, its net tax 
revenue, on average was 7.9 percent of GDP while its fiscal deficit on average was 3 
percent of GDP from 1995 to 2004, and its total public debt was 51 percent of GDP by 
2002. The large number of tax expenditures contributed to the low tax revenue received, 
as well as to the cause of fiscal deficit and high public debt
10, leading to fiscal 
unsustainability.  
                                                 
10 “Bangladesh: Selected Issues,” IMF, June 2005.   10
 
2.  Tax expenditures, because they are funded from the tax base, affect prioritizing 
fiscal allocations.  Tax expenditures (regardless effective or efficiency) have a 
higher priority than direct expenditures (regardless of whether they are 
mandatory or discretionary).   
 
All tax expenditure programs automatically have a higher budget priority than 
direct expenditure programs, whether the direct expenditure programs are for national 
defense or social welfare programs. Even though the main concerns in many developing 
countries are economic growth and poverty reduction, tax expenditures have a higher 
priority than direct expenditure programs for infrastructure, economic growth, education, 
health, poverty reduction, and so forth. Most poor people do not benefit from tax 
expenditures because their incomes are below tax thresholds.    
 
3.  Tax expenditures reduce the effectiveness and efficiency of public resource 
allocations: for example, some tax expenditures overlap or conflict with direct 
expenditures, some tax expenditures are outdated, and sometimes different tax 
expenditures are not coordinated. 
 
Tax expenditures have not been integrated into the budget process for 
appropriation.  There is no requirement to coordinate them with respective budget 
allocations. As a result, some tax expenditures overlap, are redundant, or conflict with 
budget spending and objectives. Tax expenditures are usually do not have expiration 
dates or “sunset” provisions and are rarely reviewed. Some tax expenditures are not 
coordinated with other tax expenditures, undermining the effectiveness and efficiency in 
allocating public resources. 
 
Tax expenditures are enacted as permanent changes in the tax structures. Some 
tax expenditures are outdated and are no longer effective because they were originally 
enacted in response to a particular set of economic and social conditions that have long 
since changed.   
 
For example, in the United States, some tax expenditures overlap with direct 
expenditures.  The tax credit provided by the federal government to assist in the 
construction of low-income rental housing overlaps with the grants provided by the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (from the federal budget) to develop 
public for the same purpose. Also in the United States, a federal allocation program (a 
direct expenditure program) to clean up the lead, uranium and asbestos in the 
environment conflicts with an income tax credit (a tax expenditure) that subsidizes the 
production of these metals.  
 
There are about 70 U. S. tax expenditures that were enacted before 1950. Based 
on the original objectives of those provisions, many appear no longer relevant. For 
example, the income tax exclusion of benefits and allowances to armed forces personnel 
was enacted in 1925. Its roots can be traced back to a temporary condition during World 
War I. The tax exclusion still exists even though this temporary condition seems no   11
longer relevant. The revenue loss caused by this particular item is estimated to be US$2.9 
billion in 2005. 
 
In Indonesia before the tax reform in 1984, there was a big revenue drain from the 
simultaneous operation of two uncoordinated tax expenditures. The Indonesian tax 
system exempted from interest income received on deposit accounts. However, the  tax 
system allowed an unlimited deduction for interest paid on debt. Companies could easily 
arrange a borrow-and-redeposit scheme with their banks, yielding a deductible interest 
expense, and tax-free interest income.  This was referred to as an “interest pump.”  The 
net effect was risk-free income at the expense of the treasury. 
 
In China, there was a briefing from the Ministry of Finance about the 
overlap/redundancy, conflict, and noncoordination of tax expenditures that resulted in the 
waste of a large amount of public resources
11. 
 
4.  Tax expenditures increase the complexity of the tax system (second to structural 
provisions), and enormously complicate tax administration. Taking advantage of 
the complicated tax system and the overburdened tax administration, the 
abusive taxpayers would evade and avoid tax liabilities, causing more tax 
revenue loss.   
 
According to the tax expenditure concept, tax structures has two distinct 
components. The normative or benchmark tax structure functions by raising tax revenue 
(which contains structural provisions). The other component, tax expenditures, functions 
as government spending programs. Considering that the normative tax structure itself is 
extraordinary complex (for example, taxing the transactions across international borders 
and taxing the intricate financial transactions involving the capital structures of large 
corporations), tax expenditure provisions, in a second category, add increased unrelated 
complexity to the tax code. Nevertheless, if tax simplification is considered, tax 
simplification of structural provisions and of tax expenditure provisions involves distinct 
and generally not interchangeable criteria and objectives (Surrey and McDaniel, 1985). 
 
Indeed, tax expenditure greatly complicate and overburden tax administration, 
especially when number and size of tax expenditures is large and hundreds of tax 
expenditure programs are carried out through tax system.  
 
For example, The U.S. tax system is plagued with 146 tax expenditure programs 
at an amount of US$850 billion, about 37 percent of direct expenditures. While direct 
expenditures are carried out by related special departments, tax expenditures are the 
responsibility of tax administration. Those tax expenditure programs encompass hundreds 
of specific programs with specific goals and conditions (for example, they are used for 
specific activities in national defense, environmental protection, historical preservation, 
energy, roads, education, and many other economic and social needs).  All those 
                                                 
11 Yaobin Shi, “Establishing a Tax Expenditure Administrative System That Achieves a Sound Fiscal 
System in China,” in ‘Tax Expenditures-Shedding Light on Government Spending through the Tax 
System,” 2004.    12
programs require expertise that tax administration officials usually lack. Thus, the 
responsibility for carrying out tax expenditure programs adds complexity and causes 
ineffectiveness in tax administration.  
 
Because the task for tax administration is enormous and complex, various 
schemes of tax abuse have emerged, such as transfer pricing, “company churning,” 
“tailor-made loopholes,” and so forth, which cause losses of revenue.  
 
Tax holidays, for example, which provide tax incentives to business firms to 
invest in host countries or desired locations to promote economic growth, are often 
abused by using “transfer pricing.” The firms transfer income from other subsidiaries and 
affiliated entities (including those in other countries) to the entity subject to tax holiday; 
then they divert/transfer expenses from that entity to taxable subsidiaries and affiliated 
entities.   
 
Business also use “company churning” by liquidating and reconstituting existing 
companies to make them subject to the tax holiday provisions that apply only to new 
companies.   
 
Business that are not qualified for tax holidays also try to tailor themselves to be 
subject to the tax holidays. For example, many multinational firms often use transfer 
pricing and “company churning” to avoid or evade their tax liabilities.    
 
In China, there was a “tailor-made loophole” case in which a local Chinese 
company arranged to qualify for a tax holiday for foreign investments. That Chinese 
company transferred its funds to its bank account in Hong Kong.  Then the company 
transferred its funds from its account with the Hong Kong Bank back to the mainland to 
become foreign investment (funding from Hong Kong was considered as foreign 
investment). Thus, this company received tax holidays that applied to foreign investment. 
 
Abuse schemes can result in large tax revenue losses. Most of the business are 
large, have high incomes, and perform large transactions; by abusing tax expenditures, 
they caused heavy losses of tax revenue.  
 
5.  Tax expenditures that are loosely subject to financial discipline/scrutiny provide 
an opportunity for abuse by government officials and legislators either for self-
enrichment or to provide benefits to favored interests.  
 
Tax expenditures, a form of governmental financial assistance, have a direct and 
often large cash value to potential recipients. Consequently, companies and business 
groups have a strong motivation to lobby for tax incentives by exaggerating the 
prospective economic or social benefits. These lobbying activities often lead to a 
proliferation of tax expenditures and undermine spending efficiency and fiscal 
accountability. Also, the direct cash value of tax expenditures can become an open 
inducement to bribery and corruption.  
   13
Abuses would be particularly likely when the discretion for granting tax 
expenditures is large, criteria are vague, agreements are confidential, and mechanisms are 
lacking to track and control revenue losses and other fiscal costs (Technical Report 
“Effectiveness and Economic Impact of Tax Incentives in the SADC
12 Region,” 2004).  
In Tanzania in 1996, the minister of finance authorized tax rate and tariffs rate reductions 
to four companies that imported 4,700 tons of cooking oil. As a result, both the minister 
of finance and the principal secretary in the president’s office received US$1.5 million 




In India, a tax exemption was granted to the favorable partners of legislators.  In 
the 1980s, an organization called Dardionu Rahat Fund (the fund) provided medicines, 
fruits and other requirements to poor patients free of cost.  Minister of Finance Pranab 
Mukherjee and the Justice of Supreme Court P.N. Bhagwati attended a function 
organized by the fund. At function, which was not related to government spending issues, 
the Justice urged the finance minister to provide tax exemption to donations received by 
the fund, rather than through direct government aid, to increase the recognition of the 
fund
14.   
 
                                                 
12 SADC refers to “Southern Africa Development Community.” 
13 Odd-Helge Fjeldstad, “Fighting Fiscal Corruption: The Case Of The Tanzania Revenue Authority,”  
Chr. Michelsen Institute, Norway, 2002.  
14 The Times of India (Ahmedabad), September 8, 1982, p3.    14
 
III. Fiscal Accountability and Transparency  
 
Because tax expenditures are government spending (channeled through the tax 
system), they should be subject to the same fiscal accountability and transparency criteria 
as direct expenditures. This section reviews the practice and the extent of the challenges 
facing governments (of both developed and of developing countries) in applying the 
principles of fiscal accountability and transparency to tax expenditures. 
 
A. Fiscal accountability 
 
Under internationally accepted principles, fiscal accountability entails a state 
being held responsible by its people and by its elected bodies for its financial choices and 
for its actions in using public funds. Every government has an obligation to its people and 
to its elected bodies to provide a full and complete accounting of the way the government 
has discharged its responsibilities. According to Campos/Pradhan model (Campos and 
Pradhan, 1996), fiscal accountability consists of three goals or levels of expenditure 
management for which governments should be accountable:  
 
•  Level 1: overall control, within sustainable limits, involving medium-term 
expenditure frameworks (MTEF), financial discipline and compliance with laws 
and budgets. 
•  Level 2: strategic prioritization of resource allocation. 
•  Level 3: efficient and cost-effective management of programs.  
 
To analyze fiscal accountability under the three levels above, data (on estimated 
and projected tax expenditures) are essential to enable governments to achieve the 
accountability criteria on tax expenditure spending. For that purpose, normative or 
benchmark tax structures and tax expenditures must be identified from the tax structures.  
Thus, tax expenditures can be estimated and projected. 
 
However, both estimates and projections of tax expenditures, as well as tax 
benchmarks/norms, are not always available in some countries.  These countries have 
different practices in establishing normative tax structures and estimating and projecting 
tax expenditures.  In this paper, we divided countries into three groups according to 
country practice. In group 1, countries have identified both normative or benchmark tax 
structures and tax expenditures, and produced estimates and projections for all tax 
expenditures.  In that group, most countries are high income OECD member states 
(including Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Republic Korea, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom, United States
15). In group 2, countries may or may not have identified 
normative/benchmark tax structures, nor tax expenditures, but they have produced partial 
estimates of tax expenditures (considered significant either financially or politically), 
with or without projections.  In that group, most countries are transition economies or 
                                                 
15 This list may not be complete.     15
developing countries.  In group 3, countries have identified neither normative or 
benchmark tax structures nor tax expenditures. These countries have not estimated nor 
projected tax expenditures.  In that group, countries are transition economies or 
developing countries.  
 
Table 2 provides a brief overview of selected countries on the identification of 
normative or benchmark tax structures and of tax expenditures, as well as the status in 
estimating and projecting tax expenditures.  Fiscal accountability can be described as 
follows:  
 
In group 1, for fiscal accountability at level 1, these countries are able to control 
overall public expenditure and impose financial discipline on tax expenditures within 
sustainable level and MTEF.  However, fiscal accountability at level 2 of strategic 
allocation of resources was not satisfied by all of those countries.  When tax expenditures 
must be parallel to direct expenditures for appropriation to be prioritized, there are 
differences among the countries in integrating tax expenditures into the budget process to 
strategically prioritize resources (Table 3).  For fiscal accountability at level 3 of the 
effectiveness and efficiency for individual tax expenditure, those countries have 
employed, more or less, an evaluation of cost-effectiveness, reviewing tax expenditures 
periodically, though some countries are proactive to deal with ineffectiveness tax 
expenditures than the others.   
 
Countries in group 2 estimate partial tax expenditures because they recognize that 
tax expenditures cause revenue loss.  However, because most of them have not 
established normative or benchmark tax structures, composing a full list of tax 
expenditures is difficult, as is estimating the overall size of tax expenditures.    
 
For fiscal accountability in tax expenditures for those countries, at level 1, they 
may be able to control tax expenditures partially, but they can not control overall tax 
expenditures.  At levels 2 and 3, obviously, the countries in group 2 have not complied 
with the criteria for achieving fiscal accountability. 
 
Countries in group 3 have neither established normative tax structures, nor 
estimated/projected any tax expenditures.  Those countries fail in compliance with fiscal 
accountability in tax expenditures.    16
 
Table 2: Tax Expenditure Benchmarks And Availability Of Estimates And Projections  
(selected countries, data are preliminary)   
   Structural benchmarks  Data on tax expenditures 
Australia  A conceptual tax base (five benchmarks)  Estimated and projected 
Austria  A regulatory benchmarks  Estimated and projected 
Belgium  A national conceptual benchmarks  Estimated and projected 
Canada  Conceptual benchmarks  Estimated and projected 
Finland  Conceptual benchmarks  Estimated and projected 
France  Regulatory baselines  Estimated and projected 
Germany  Tax expenditure is characterized as bring 
analogous to an expenditure subsidy.  Estimated and projected 
Greece   Regulatory baselines  Estimated and projected 
Ireland  National conceptual baseline  Estimated and projected 
Korea, Republic  Regulatory baselines  Estimated and projected 
Netherlands  Regulatory baselines  Estimated and projected 
Portugal  Regulatory baselines  Estimated and projected 
Spain  Conceptual benchmarks  Estimated and projected 
Sweden  Conceptual benchmarks  Estimated and projected 
United Kingdom  Similar to the method used in Germany  Estimated and projected 
United States  Conceptual baselines and regulatory 
baselines  Estimated and projected 
    
Argentina --  Partial  estimates 
Bangladesh  No.   Partial estimates 
Brazil  Regulatory benchmarks  -- 
Bulgaria  -- Partial  estimates 
China   No.   Partial estimates 
Latvia  No.   Partial estimates 
Hungary  -- Partial  estimates 
India   No.   Partial estimates 
Poland  No.   Partial estimates 
Notes: "--" information is not available.   
Sources: Jon Graig and William Allan, " Fiscal Transparency, Tax Expenditures and Budget  
Processes: An International Perspective," Working Paper, IMF, 2001. 
William Allan and Taryn Parry, "Fiscal Transparency in EU Accession Countries: Progress 
and Future Challenges," Working Paper, the IMF, 2003.   
Carlos Cavalcanti and Zhicheng Li, "Reforming Tax Expenditures Program in Poland," Policy Research 
Working Paper, the World Bank, 2001. 
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Table 3. Tax Expenditures Integrated into Budget Process 
(Selected countries, preliminary data) 
Australia  A separate government document.  
Austria  As an annex, part of "Subsidy Report" to budget documents 
Belgium  An annex to budget 
Canada  Not linked to budget process, but for pre-budget consultation. 
France  Appended to budget bill. 
Germany  As a part of budget, called "Subsidy Report" 
Italy  Not linked to budget process, nor as annex to budget document.  
but an independent document. 
Netherlands 
As an annex to the budget memorandum, not directly linked to the 




Not linked to budget process, nor as annex to budget document,  
but as part of statistical supplement to Autumn Statement (revenue) 
United States  As part of annual budget documents, but is not integrated into the 
budget process 
Source: H.P. Brixi et al,. "Tax Expenditures-Shedding Light On Government 
Spending Through The Tax System," the World Bank, 2003. 
 
B. Fiscal transparency 
 
Transparency in government operations has several dimensions. First, at the 
aggregate level, transparency requires the provision of reliable information on the 
government’s fiscal policy intentions and forecast. Second, detailed data and information 
are required on government operations, including the publication of comprehensive 
budget documents that contain properly classified accounts for the general government 
and estimates of quasi-fiscal activities conducted outside the government. Third, 
behavioral aspects must be present, including clearly established conflict-of-interest rules 
for elected and appointed officials, freedom-of-information requirements, a transparent 
regulatory framework, open public procurement and employment practices, a code of 
conduct for tax officials and published performance audits (Shende and Bennet, 2004). 
These aspects and dimensions of transparency are consistent with the IMF’s principles of 
fiscal transparency.  
 
The IMF has set out four principles that define transparency that should be 
expected of a government:  
•  Clarity on the structure and functions of government, responsibilities within 
government and relations between government and the rest of the economy; 
•  Public availability of comprehensive information on public sector financial stocks 
and flows, published at specified times;   18
•  Public availability of information on how budgets are prepared and executed and 
minimum content of budgets and financial reports; and 
•  Financial data meeting accepted quality standards and subjected to independent 
audit scrutiny (IMF, “Manual on Fiscal Transparency, 2001). 
 
For tax expenditure, countries comply with fiscal transparency differently among 
group 1 (established tax benchmarks and estimated and projected tax expenditures), 
group 2 (no established tax benchmarks, but partially estimated tax expenditures), and 
group 3 (no established tax benchmarks, no estimated tax expenditures).  The situation 
can be illustrated as follows: 
 
In group 1, all countries publish tax expenditure estimates and projections by 
types of taxes and by functional classification in the central government. Some countries 
also publish limited local governmental tax expenditures.   
 
However, none of the countries has published imputed tax revenue from a 
normative tax structure to make comprehensive information publicly available even 
though that information is available during the process of estimating tax expenditures and 
is critical background for tax expenditures and the transparency of the size and magnitude 
of tax expenditures.  Also, none of the countries has performed audits or published 
related auditing information.  This group is not completely satisfied with the fiscal 
transparency criteria in tax expenditures.  
 
For example, both the U.S. Treasury and the Congressional Joint Committee 
estimate and project tax expenditures. Both of them publish such information regularly. 
The GAO also publishes reviews and analyses of the effectiveness and efficiency of tax 
expenditures spending, their impacts on fiscal finance and the economy, and 
recommendations to improve them.  However, neither Treasury nor the GAO publishes 
the imputed normative tax revenue.  
 
In Germany the “Subsidies Report” includes both budgetary direct subsidies and 
tax provisions with estimates and projections.  This publication is useful to assess the 
efficiency of total government financial assistance and to reduce overlap and conflict 
spending between tax expenditures and subsidies. Recently, Germany has studied and 
intends to audit tax subsidies. However, the imputed normative tax revenue is not 
published in any government documents. 
  
In group 2, though some countries estimate partial tax expenditures and produce 
limited projections, they do not publish those estimates and projections. They do not 
compose a complete list of tax expenditures, either. Those estimates and some projections 
are not available to the public, but are only used for internal purposes by governmental 
agencies. Therefore, those countries have failed in fiscal transparency in tax expenditures.  
 
In group 3 countries do not estimate tax expenditures or publish lists of tax 
expenditures. Tax expenditures are a black box to the public. Therefore, they fail in fiscal 
transparency in tax expenditures.   19
IV. Building Blocks for Fiscal Accountability and Transparency  
 
This section discusses the building blocks to ensure spending on tax expenditures 
is accountable and transparent. There are four essential building blocks: (1) 
distinguishing the two components in the tax structure: the normative or benchmark tax 
structures and tax expenditures; (2) estimating and projecting tax expenditures; (3) 
integrating tax expenditures into budget and budget process for ensuring fiscal 
accountability; (4) auditing tax expenditures and publish comprehensive information to 
the public to ensure fiscal transparency.  
 
The building blocks are based on internationally recognized literature on tax 
expenditures, fiscal accountability, transparency, and experience in developed and 
developing countries. Though the building blocks are mostly applicable to developing 
countries, they are also useful to developed countries to improve fiscal accountability and 
transparency in tax expenditures.   
 
Building block 1. Distinguishing the normative/benchmark tax structure and 
tax expenditures   
 
According to practices in developed countries, the distinguishing the two 
components in the tax structure can be performed in parallel.  The identification of the 
component of a normative tax structure can be preceded by responding to one of the 
questions (6 of them) in the Box 3 below.  
 
Behind each of the 6 questions is a pure tax policy decision on tax base, rate 
structure, taxable unit, tax period, international transactions, and tax administration; so 
the given provision can be identified either as a normative tax structures or a tax 
expenditures. Seven developed countries (Canada, Germany, France, the Netherlands, 
Sweden, United Kingdom and United States) have used that guideline to identify their 
normative tax structures and tax expenditures.  
 
Normative tax structures among developed countries, however, differ because of 
the policy choices in tax rate, tax structures, taxable unit, tax period, international 
transactions and tax administration because of differences in national politics, history, 
philosophy, sociological, and the like. Despite those differences, most tax structures 
employed in the world include provisions that are not responsive to one of the questions 
posed in Box 3. Therefore, they do not form part of the normative tax structures; they are 
tax expenditures. The questions in Box 3 were formulated by McDeniel and Surry for 
developed countries.   
 
For transition and developing economies, the guideline in Box 3 is essential to 
distinguish normative tax structures from tax expenditures, though some modifications of 
the guideline corresponding to specific economic conditions in transition and developing 
economies may also are necessary.  
   20
 
For example, for a typical middle income country, the guideline must be modified 
with additional criteria (Box 4) because this economy has a high share of population in 
agriculture sector (45 percent of population), a large share of employment at minimum 
wage and a relatively large share employed in the informal sector and unrecorded sectors 
(about 25 percent of GDP). That difficult economic structure, coupled with the past 
economic instabilities reflected in high and highly variable inflation rates, lead to specific 
choices of tax structures in the country. Its tax collection mostly depends on tax 
withholding.  Therefore, additional criteria (in Box 4) have been used in identifying tax 
benchmarks for PIT, CIT and VAT and special customs tax.  
  
Nevertheless, the identification of the normative tax structure is a starting point 
and checkpoint during the process of classification. Some provisions are on the 
borderline creating difficulty in determining what provisions should be included or 
excluded from the normative tax structures.  
 
As a result, not all conceptual deviations from the normal tax structure should be 
classified as tax expenditures. To properly classify a provision as a tax expenditure or as 
part of the normative structure requires consideration of not only to tax theory, but also 
the legislative history of existing provisions, the reasons offered by proponents of a new 
tax proposal, and the defenses relied on rules that are proposed to be terminated or 






Box 3.  Identification Of The Normative Tax Structure 
 
Identification of the normative tax structure can best proceed by determining 
whether a given provision responds to one of the following questions: 
 
1)  Is the provision necessary to determine the base of the tax, normatively 
defined, in accordance with the fundamental nature of the tax?  
2)  Is the provision part of the generally applicable rate structure? 
3)  Is the provision necessary to define the taxable units liable for the tax?  
4)  Is the provision necessary to assure that the tax is determined within the time 
period selected for imposition of the tax? 
5)  Is the provision necessary to implement the tax in international transactions?  
6)  Is the provision necessary to administer the tax?  
 
Source: P.R. McDaniel, and S. Surrey, “International Aspects of Tax 
Expenditures: A comparative Study,” Kluwer, 1984.    21
 
Building block 2. Estimating and projecting tax expenditures  
 
The estimating/accounting tax expenditures gives a quantitative measure of the 
size of tax expenditures and their impacts on revenue loss, direct budget expenditures, 
and budget balance, in addition to providing data for cost-effective analysis in tax 
expenditures. Projections of tax expenditures provide similar information for the medium 
term budget framework (MTBF).  
 
Methods of estimating and projecting tax expenditures used include revenue 
foregone, revenue gain, and outlay equivalent methods. However, In the OECD and most 
countries’ experience, the revenue foregone method is usually recommended for 
estimating tax expenditures.  
 
The revenue foregone method estimates the cost of a tax expenditure as the 
deviation between the tax paid by taxpayers affected by a specific tax provision and tax 
paid by similar taxpayers not affected by that provision. The estimated value of tax 
expenditure is the economic value on an accrual basis and is consistent with the principal 
of the Government Finance Statistics (GFS) and harmonized with statistics of the 1993 
System National Accounts (SNA) for revenue estimates (on accrual basis) in GFS.  
However, that method does not take into account changes in taxpayers’ behavior. 
 
The revenue foregone method estimates tax expenditures one at a time. It does not 
account for the change from the removal of one provision that may result in increased use 
of other provisions, lowering tax revenue elsewhere.  Also, the revenue foregone method 
does not take into account that the removal of a tax expenditure may result in some 
taxpayers moving into a higher marginal tax bracket under a progressive income tax 
system. Those issues, however, could be tackled down with the development of 
technology.   
 
Box 4. Additional Principal Criteria For a Tax Benchmark  
(an example for a middle income country case) 
 
The normative tax benchmark should  
•  Represent a consistent tax treatment of similar activities or classes of taxpayers 
and neither favor nor disadvantage similarly placed activities or classes of 
taxpayers. 
•  Include certain tax provisions (such as exemptions, deductions, tax credits, and 
other tax preferences) to adjust taxable income in order to: 
o  comply with the ability-to-pay principle; 
o  enhance the economic and collection efficiency of taxation; 
o  simplify or make feasible tax administration with respect to a class of 
taxpayers or type of activity. 
•  Ensure that tax expenditure report provides sufficient information for policy 
formulation.    22
In estimating and projecting tax expenditures, a reliable database is a major factor 
in ensuring the reliability of the estimates. The best initial source for the database is tax 
returns filed by taxpayers. Other sources for the database include national accounts, 
population survey, industry surveys, and trade and production statistics. Those data 
sources are also used to cross-check tax expenditure estimates. The methods used in tax 
expenditure estimates and projections include the aggregate model, the distributional 
model, or the microsimulation model, based on the sufficiency and reliability of the 
database
16.   
 
A database with sufficiently detailed data must be developed over time.  It takes 
at least two years to develop a basic tax database for initial estimating tax expenditures. 
Therefore, any development relating to tax database for this purpose must be planned and 
begin as soon as possible.  
                                                 
16 The detailed methodology and techniques for estimating tax expenditures could refer to related technical 




























Building block 3.  Integrating tax expenditures into annual budget 
appropriations and MTBF for fiscal accountability 
 
Tax expenditures must be integrated into the budget to form a complete budget 
for fiscal accountability. As discussed previously in fiscal accountability section, 
integrating tax expenditures into the budget process would better coordinate tax 
expenditure with direct expenditures to achieve the fiscal accountability at the three 
levels: first, overall control within sustainable limits; second, strategic prioritization of 
resource allocation, and third, efficiency and cost-effective management of programs.  
 
At first level, tax expenditures should be subject to overall controls within 
sustainable limits (involving medium-term expenditure frameworks), financial discipline 
and compliance with laws and budgets (similarly to direct budget expenditures). Tax 
expenditures must be analyzed along with imputed normative tax revenue, tax revenue 
received, direct expenditures, and fiscal deficit to form a comprehensive spending ceiling 
within sustainable limits. 
 
Tax expenditures should also integrate with direct budget expenditures in order to 
jointly control aggregate spending and the deficit. That means tax expenditures should be 
Box 5: Measuring Tax Expenditures 
There are three principal ways to estimate the costs or value of tax expenditures: 
revenue forgone; revenue gain, outlay equivalence.  All three methods are used within 
the OECD area.  
•  Revenue forgone. It is defined as the amount by which tax revenue is reduced 
because of the existence of a particular provision. It is based upon a comparison 
of the existing legislation and the legislation without the tax provision in question. 
It is an ex-post measure of the cost of a particular relief.  The behavior of tax 
payers is taken as observed in the year for which the calculations are being made. 
•  Revenue gain: it is defined as the amount increased in revenue that could be 
expected if a particular relief were to be abolished.  To obtain an accurate 
estimate of the revenue gain that could be expected from the withdrawal of a 
relief requires, in principle, that the behavioral or secondary effects associated 
with such a change be taken into account. These effects include: the behavioral 
effects of taxpayers, feedback effect and interaction between taxes (which do not 
take into account these secondary effects because o the difficulties involved in 
measuring them). 
•  Outlay equivalence approach. This approach estimates what direct expenditure 
outlays would be required, in pre-tax dollars, to achieve the same after-tax dollar 
benefit if a tax expenditure were replaced by a corresponding direct expenditure 
programmer, under which the direct outlay is accorded the tax treatment 
appropriate to that type of income in the hands of the recipients. This is 
essentially a resource cost measure.  
Source: K.C. Messere, “Tax Policy in OECD Countries,” Amsterdam, 1993.   24
scrutinized by similar techniques as those applied to budgetary direct expenditures. Those 
includes (1) setting up proper ceilings and floors to ensure tax expenditures are under 
control; (2) setting up a schedule for periodic re-approval/appropriation of tax 
expenditures to ensure financial discipline and compliance with laws and budgets;
17 (3) 
redesign or elimination of tax expenditures deemed inefficient or outdated; (4) seeking 
specific savings targets in tax expenditures for the reduction of fiscal deficit. A reduction 
in tax expenditures could be used to meet deficit targets or facilitate the increase in other 
tax expenditures or direct budget expenditure programs.   
 
To achieve savings from tax expenditures, for example, tax expenditures can be 
designed to use a tax credit instead of a tax deduction in a progressive tax rate structures. 
Because a tax expenditure interacts with tax rates, when statutory rates are higher, the 
ability to exclude or deduct a particular portion of one’s income is worth more; 
consequently, tax expenditures are larger. Similarly, the value of tax expenditures like 
deductions or exclusions from income is greater for taxpayers in higher tax brackets than 
for those in lower brackets. Therefore, tax credit, tax reductions, exclusions have 
different effects on the cost of tax expenditures, which must be carefully considered when 
seeking savings in tax expenditures. 
 
At the second level, tax expenditures should closely coordinate with direct 
expenditures to ensure that priorities are established that take both types of spending into 
account during budget appropriation.  Tax expenditures could be grouped into functional 
classifications and each group paralleled with the corresponding functional direct budget 
expenditures.  That enables the government to determine the total resource allocation 
under each of the functional areas. Also, comparison of direct expenditures with tax 
expenditures in the same functional area enables the government to determine whether 
the cost of tax expenditures is high relative to direct expenditures. In that situation, that 
government could consider targeting savings from tax expenditures to strategically 
prioritize resource allocation.  
 
Close coordination of tax expenditures and direct expenditures during budget 
appropriation could ensure that overlap or duplication can be avoided. That also facilitate 
explicit trade-offs between tax expenditures and direct budget expenditures.  
 
While weighing the options between eliminating tax expenditures (resulted in a 
tax increase) or a reducing direct budget spending on balance of budget rules, a reduction 
in government spending on goods and services is likely to be more harmful to the 
economy in the short run than an increase in taxes. The reason is that any tax increase 




                                                 
17 Because tax return will be filled only once a year, the periodic review may conduct once a year, once in 
two years, within a given schedule.  
18 Peter Orszag and Joseph Stiglitz, “Spending Cuts Vs. Tax Increases at the State Level: Is One More 
Counter-Productive Than the Other During a Recession?” Brookings Institute, Nov. 6, 2001.     25
Many countries have tried to coordinate tax expenditures and direct expenditures 
while considering the priority and the effectiveness in resource allocation. Germany, for 
example, uses the “Subsidies Report” (which includes both budgetary subsidies and tax 
expenditures), which facilitate the government’s decision in increase or decrease resource 
allocation either in tax expenditures or in direct budget expenditures.   
 
Canadian’s envelop method, for example, integrates tax expenditures into budget 
allocation.  According to a budget spending ceiling assigned to a ministry, the ministry 
must decide to use either tax expenditures or direct expenditures within the assigned 
budget (that method was stopped due to political reasons).   
 
At the third level, to ensure the accountability of individual tax expenditure 
programs, programs must be evaluated individually for relevance, effectiveness and 
efficiency.   
 
Relevance concerns whether a tax expenditure is consistent with policy priorities 
and if it realistically address an actual need. Typically, consideration of the circumstances 
that led to the implementation of a tax expenditure is essential to determine if the 
measure continues to address a real need in a manner consistent with current social and 
economic conditions, as well as with policy priorities. 
 
Relevance is also important in determining whether other policy instruments can 
be used to achieve the same - or similar – objectives. Alternatively, the nature of the 
economic or social goals and policy objectives may favor one type of instrument over 
another. To the extent that alternatives exist, it is necessary to ascertain whether the tax 
expenditure uniquely achieves some outcome that the alternatives cannot.  
 
Effectiveness concerns whether tax expenditures are meeting objectives 
effectively, within budget and without unwanted outcomes.  This includes the target 
population, changes in economic behavior or conditions, and the cost of the tax 
expenditures. Unintended or unforeseen effects, either positive or negative, may be 
important considerations in assessing effectiveness.  
 
Efficiency concerns whether tax expenditure is the most appropriate and efficient 
means of achieving objectives, relative to alternative design and delivery approaches. 
Evaluating efficiency focus on the allocation of resources in an economy (or the level and 
mix of goods and services produced). When an economy is operating efficiently, 
resources are fully employed and producing as much output as possible. 
 
The economic efficiency of tax expenditures can, in principle, be quantified and 
summarized as an overall change in real income. By influencing prices or costs, tax 
expenditures reallocate resources and real income among markets.  They also impose 
compliance costs on taxpayers, as well as administration and financing costs on 
government.  The net effect of those various influences on overall real income signals an 
improvement or reduction in economic efficiency and can only be determined empirically   26
(Gordon, J. Lenjosek, 2004)
19. Cost-effectiveness and excess burden of taxation are two 
main steps to evaluate economic efficiency of tax expenditures.  
 
Building block 4. Ensuring fiscal transparency in tax expenditures  
 
The four essential rules of the IMF’s “Code of Good Practices on Fiscal 
Transparency” should be fully applied to tax expenditures to ensure fiscal transparency.  
The four rules are: 
Rule 1: Clarity of roles and responsibilities 
Rule 2. Public available of information 
Rule 3. Budget preparation, execution, and reporting 
Rule 4. Assurances of integrity 
 
The following discusses how to ensure fiscal transparency in tax expenditures.  
 
Rule 1   
•  There must be clarification of the structure and functions of the government, of 
the responsibilities within the government, and of the relations between 
governments (including central and local governments, and ministries) in 
authorizing and managing tax expenditures. Clear mechanisms for coordination 
and management of tax expenditures should be established.  
 
•  There should be a clear legal and administrative framework for the management 
of tax expenditures. Government spending of tax expenditures should be 
governed by comprehensive related laws and openly available administrative 
rules. Clear criteria should guide any administrative discretion in their application 
of tax expenditures. Ethical standards of behavior for public servants should be 
clear and well publicized. 
 
Rule 2   
•  Comprehensive information must be publicly available on tax expenditures, 
including the normative/benchmark tax structures, imputed normative tax revenue, 
and individual tax expenditure (with rationale, sunset date, cost estimates and 
projections, evaluations and alternative policy options which may increase 
effectiveness and efficiency).  
 
•  Information must be publicly available on whether tax expenditures are 
considered in the preparing the annual governmental budget, specifically on 
whether tax expenditures are coordinated with direct expenditures in functional 
areas during the budgetary process and whether the use of tax expenditures has 
resulted in budgetary savings. 
 
                                                 
19 This term is used to underscore the notion that, in general, taxes impose a burden both on the persons 
who must pay the tax and on society as a whole in the form of lower output.    27
•  Government should commit to the timely publication of comprehensive 
information of tax expenditures.  
 
Rule 3   
•  A statement of fiscal policy objectives and an assessment of fiscal sustainability 
should include both direct budget expenditure and tax expenditures. The complete 
budget document should include the normative tax structures with estimates of 
“imputed normative tax revenue.”  
•  Annual spending on tax expenditures should be prepared and presented within a 
comprehensive and consistent quantitative macroeconomic framework and the 
main assumptions underlying the budget should be provided. 
•  New tax expenditures being introduced in the annual budget should be clearly 
described.  
•  Tax expenditure information should be presented in a way that facilitates policy 
analysis and promotes accountability.  
•  Procedures for monitoring approved tax expenditures should be clearly specified.  
•  There should be regular fiscal reporting (annual or in a fixed time period) on tax 
expenditures (cost, effectiveness, and efficiency) to the legislature and the public.  
 
Rule 4   
•  Tax expenditure data should reflect recent flows and trends, underlying 
macroeconomic developments and well-defined policy commitments. 
•  Tax expenditure information should be subject to independent scrutiny and the 
data quality should be subject to verification. 
•  Tax expenditures should be audited for their performance, using economy and 
efficiency audit and programs audit to assess the performance of the government 
organization, program activity or function. This audit can provide information to 
improve the organization’s public accountability and facilitate decision making 
that initiates corrective action.  It can also be used to assess the performance of an 
entity, a program or an activity within that entity to determine whether the entity 





Tax incentives are tax expenditures. Tax expenditures are conceptually and 
functionally distinct from those tax provisions that have the purpose of raising revenue.  
They are government spending programs comparable to entitlement programs.  Therefore, 
they must be analyzed in spending terms and must be integrated into the budgetary 
process to ensure fiscal accountability. Tax expenditures must be audited for performance, 
and their information must be published (with a comprehensive analysis) to achieve fiscal 
transparency.  
 
The building blocks introduced in this article are useful for making tax 
expenditures accountable and transparent.  However, they are presented in general terms. 
In applying the building blocks, each country must make specific decisions when it   28
establishes a normative tax structure, identifies tax expenditures, and integrates tax 
expenditures into the budget.   
 
For fiscal transparency, it is helpful to the public if the government publishes not 
only the size of tax expenditures, but also the size of the imputed normative tax revenue, 
which is estimated during the process of estimating tax expenditures.  Thus, the public 
will learn not only how much government spending is in the form of tax expenditures, but 
also how much normative tax revenue the government would collect if there were no tax 
expenditures.   
 
Furthermore, normative/benchmark tax structure, a revenue-raising component of 
the tax system, should be formalized.  The normative/benchmark tax structure should be 
legally defined in the tax law and should be transparent.  The tax receipts from this 
normative/benchmark tax structure should be quantified and published.  Presently, many 
countries could publish imputed tax revenue from normative/benchmark tax structures, 
because such data is available.  Only if imputed tax revenue is published in the same way 
as the other budget components -- tax revenue received, tax expenditures, direct 
expenditures and fiscal balance -- will a budget system be truly transparent in terms of 
revenue-raising activities and expenditure activities.  In addition, when the tax revenue-
raising activity is formalized, the inherent spending nature of tax expenditures is further 
exposed.  Therefore, tax expenditures should be added to direct expenditures, forming 
total government expenditures.  In addition, the conventional concept of the size of 
government should be remedied by including both direct expenditures and tax 
expenditures.   
 
Unfortunately, historically, in the absence of an effective program of fiscal 
accountability and transparency, even when some tax expenditures reduced or eliminated 
and tax bases are broadened during “tax reform,” new tax expenditures are often enacted 




Tax experts have a critical role in shaping tax expenditure policy towards fiscal 
accountability and transparency. To achieve this goal, tax experts should recognize the 
concept of tax expenditures, distinguish the inherent expenditure nature of tax 
expenditures from the tax revenue-raising nature of the normative/benchmark tax 
structures, and help the developing countries to establish building blocks of fiscal 
accountability and transparency to avoid repeating the unfortunate lessons of the past.  
 
                                                 
20 For example, in the US, although aggregate tax expenditure revenue losses declined following 
implementation of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, revenue losses are growing again shortly afterward.  The 
level of tax expenditure revenue losses fell after 1986 primarily because of rate reductions, but also because 
of repeal and scale-backs of may tax expenditures (GAO report 1994).  According to GAO report, the 
aggregate tax expenditures was 402 billion USD in fiscal year 1993, it has grown to $859 billion in fiscal 
year 2004. Therefore, GAO (report 2005) proposed for another tax reform in the US tax system.     29
Finally, following the principles developed by Surrey, we hope the developing 
countries will benefit from the concept and scope of tax expenditures and that their fiscal 
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